Is Somalia Doomed to Repeat History?

Tim Lister

“Look, these people, they have no jobs, no food, no education, no future. I just figure that we have two things we can do. Help, or we can sit back and watch a country destroy itself on CNN.” –Sgt. Matt Eversmann in “Blackhawk Down.”

Pity the poor Somalis, or the millions of them that have not yet found sanctuary in Europe, Canada or the United States. Recent events seem to have sucked them back into the cycle of violence and destruction that ruined the country in the 1990s, and made Somalia the poster-child for the concept of the failed state — a country without institutions or basic services, where malnutrition is commonplace. Now, the possibility of reconciliation among competing groups may be evaporating as clans once again squabble over the spoils of victory and the vanquished melt away, only to plot their return.

In the final days of 2006, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) was swept out of Somalia’s capital — six months after their equally sudden seizure of Mogadishu. In between, the ICU had spread its authority through Mogadishu and beyond to much of central and southern Somalia, bringing a rare sense of security and even reopening Mogadishu’s airport for the first time in 13 years. The demise of the Islamic Courts was inflicted not by their opponents in the transitional government but by an invasion of Ethiopian troops and armor. Its defeat exposed suspected al-Qaida operatives that had taken shelter in Mogadishu — and suddenly brought the United States into Somalia’s nightmare in the most visible way for a decade.

This latest upheaval in Somalia prompts more questions than answers. Will the Ethiopians now stay in Somalia to provide order or withdraw quickly and hope that the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) can establish its authority? Is this the moment at which African peacekeeping proves itself? Have the Islamic Courts and the foreign fighters who came to Somalia to support them given up the fight, or can we now expect guerrilla war, suicide attacks and car bombs? What does this display of Ethiopian military muscle convey to its neighbors, and especially its adversary Eritrea — which had supported the Islamic Courts? And will the return of the clans herald a return to anarchy in Mogadishu and yet another humanitarian crisis in Somalia?

The Islamic Courts - A Brief Interlude

Despite its bravado in challenging the Ethiopians, the Islamic Courts Union turned out to be a paper tiger. Once the Ethiopians had decided to commit offensive airpower and armor — rather than just hold a cordon around the TFG stronghold of Baidoa — the Islamists had little chance in battle. After suffering significant casualties in what the International Red Cross described as the heaviest fighting in Somalia for a decade, a sizeable number withdrew first to the port of Kismayo south of Mogadishu (incidentally the point of entry for hundreds of foreign fighters) and then scattered into hills and forests close to the Kenyan border. With the Ethiopians in hot pursuit, fighting was reported close to the Kenyan border in the early days of the New Year.

All of which was very welcome to Washington, after a series of reversals in Somalia. The United States had long asserted that several al-Qaida operatives involved in the 1998 attacks on U.S. embassies in East Africa had taken refuge in Somalia, including Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, who has a $5 million bounty on his head. But after the debacle of the multinational mission in 1992-93, Washington had no appetite for another foray into Somalia. In June 2006, the clan militia funded by the CIA as a counterweight to the Islamists fled Mogadishu — and the Islamic Courts quickly established themselves. U.S. intelligence and Central Command were increasingly worried by the meshing of the Islamist militia and al-Qaida elements, especially with the establishment of military training camps. Ethiopia’s intervention was therefore welcomed and may have been encouraged by Washington. The Ethiopians had their own reasons for moving against the Islamists, concerned that they might destabilize Ogaden, a Muslim part of Ethiopia long claimed by Somalia, and that Eritrea might supply the Islamists with better weapons — making them harder to dislodge later on.

As the Islamists were flushed out of Mogadishu, the United States launched aerial reconnaissance and interdiction missions from Djibouti — home to the U.S. military’s Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa — and positioned the U.S.S. Dwight D. Eisenhower and other elements of the Fifth Fleet off the Somali coast. One strike by an AC-130 gunship close to Somalia’s border with Kenya is known to have killed several people. But none of the al-Qaida suspects is known to have been killed. Another target also evaded capture: Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, one of the most prominent leaders in the ICU, who is on both U.S. and U.N. terrorist watch lists. He is a Salafist, inspired by a highly conservative Wahabbi form of Islam.

Regional Tremors

As Somalia’s neighbors are only too aware, the Islamists may have vanished; they have not been eradicated. Kenya sealed its 400-mile frontier with Somalia and tried to prevent a fresh influx of Somalis — unable to distinguish between refugees fleeing yet another round of warfare in Somalia and Islamist fighters trying to evade capture. It even deported several hundred would-be refugees back across the border; Kenya already has plenty of trouble from Somali bandits in its arid north. The “true believers,” as opposed to clans that came on board when the winds had shifted in favor of the ICU, are unlikely to accept the occupation of Somalia by the “infidel’ Ethiopians,” as they always call them. They may also get support from foreign fighters with experience in waging guerrilla war. Al-Qaida leaders and affiliated Web sites have frequently appealed for fighters to support the Islamists in Somalia — an appeal renewed in a new audio recording by al Qaeda No. 2 Ayman al-Zawahiri. One ominous portent perhaps: On Jan. 2, in the southern town of Jilib, a lone gunman shouting “God is great” killed three Ethiopians, including a commanding officer.

When the Islamic Courts were expelled, some residents of the capital were relieved that strict Sharia law, which had forbidden movies and televised soccer and the chewing of the narcotic qat leaf, was gone. But for most, apprehension was the dominant sentiment. Occupying Mogadishu, as U.S. and other forces found in the 1990s, is a perilous undertaking. A city of narrow streets and alleys and hundreds of wrecked buildings, it is perfect territory for snipers and suicide bombers. The Ethiopians say they want to withdraw from Somalia within weeks, aware of the potential quagmire it might otherwise become. Even on the day they entered Mogadishu, some Ethiopian convoys were attacked by crowds throwing stones. Two weeks later, an ambush of a Somali/Ethiopian convoy in the south of the city, where the Islamic Courts were strongest, left two people dead. The transitional government has declared martial law to try to bring order to the city.

Besides the Islamist threat, there is the task of subduing various clans that use checkpoints as a license for extortion and harass businesses. There is no police presence in Mogadishu, so that task will fall to soldiers of the transitional government and the Ethiopians. TFG Prime Minister Ali Mohammed Gedi declared a weapons amnesty in the capital, but Somalis tend not to give up weapons voluntarily, and first indications are that many citizens have kept their guns fearful of a return to warlordism. Within two weeks of the Islamists’ expulsion, there were signs of a resurgence in clan warfare. Several were killed in a firefight between TFG troops and militia of clan leader Mohamed Qanyare Afrah outside the Villa Somalia, the presidential residence. “Another Iraq is not going to happen in Somalia,” declared Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, but the Ethiopians are facing overlapping conflicts and rivalries that would be familiar to U.S. commanders in Baghdad.

International Options

As the situation in Mogadishu, Kismayo and much of southern Somalia remains fragile, the overarching question for the international community is whether the use of force has brought security and reconciliation any closer. Washington has suggested that moderate elements within the Islamic Courts be courted, but the transitional government has rejected the idea. Europe opposed the Ethiopian offensive and was also critical of U.S. airstrikes — arguing that stability in Somalia could only be achieved if all elements were brought together. The EU had been actively engaged in brokering talks between the ICU and the transitional government days before the Islamists stepped up offensive operations around Baidoa and the Ethiopians responded decisively. EU Aid Commissioner Louis Michel said unilateral military action “risked having a negative impact on the peace and reconciliation process.” The Italian Foreign Minister, Massimo d’Alema, offered similar views, condemning “unilateral initiatives that could set off new tensions in an area already marked by high instability.”

The next few weeks and months will tell whether stability and reconciliation can be engineered out of yet another upheaval. It will be a tall order. Moderate elements of the Islamic Courts have been driven underground, along with more radical figures. There are signs that old clan rivalries within the transitional government are resurfacing. Crucial to the government’s chances is a balance between the Hawiye clan dominant in Mogadishu and others such as the Darod clan of President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed. Abdullahi is from the far north of Somalia. The signs are mixed: Lawmakers are trying to oust the Speaker of the Parliament Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden, who is a Hawiye and tried to broker talks with the ICU late last year. But Prime Minister Gedi at least is a Hawiye and a conciliator. There will be much jockeying for advantage over the months to come, but can it be restricted to the political arena?

There is much talk but little progress toward building an African peacekeeping force for Somalia. Ethiopia and Kenya have appealed to African states that don’t border Somalia to step up. Uganda has offered about 1,500 troops — others are thinking about contributing but are already stretched in existing missions. The Darfur experience is not the most promising precedent; African peacekeepers would lack resources even in a benign environment, let alone in volatile Mogadishu. And fewer governments will step forward as the situation becomes more tenuous. TFG Prime Minister Gedi has insisted the first African peacekeepers will be deployed by the end of January — and he even named Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa and Malawi as contributors. But Nigeria says it won’t make any decision before a summit of the African Union at the end of January, and Senegal says it has no plans to contribute.

Without dialog and security, the prospects of rebuilding Somalia’s shattered infrastructure are virtually nil. It is still possible that the specter of a return to warlordism and another decade of warfare will concentrate minds in Mogadishu, and the international community will push the transitional government to deal with moderates among the Islamists. But it will require the sort of consistent pressure that has been lacking over the past decade — as well as generous aid. The alternative: Ethiopian troops dealing with clan violence and Islamist guerrilla attacks; a Transitional Government dividing into factions again; and no international peacekeeping presence imminent. There is also the risk of a dangerous confluence between the aims of Islamic extremists and the centuries old animosity of Somalis for Ethiopia. The result: Somalia retreating to the anarchy that gave rise to the Islamic Courts in the first place, and a renewed hankering among most Somalis for a return of the stability of the Islamic Courts. That, after all, is why many Afghans welcomed the Taliban.